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732 PEOPIJE EX REL. SKELLY v. CITY Q.ll' GLENDALE [40 C.2d 
[L. A. No. 22f\OO. In Bank. Apr. 24, 1953.] 
THB PIWPLB ex rel. liJDWA.RD .T. SKELLY, Appellant, v. 
CITY OF GLENDALE, Respondent. 
[1] Municipal Corporations-Annexation of Territory-Notice of 
Election.-Gov. Code, § 35123, requiring that notice of electio11 
to annex territory to city be published in newspaper of general 
circulation "at least once a week for the four weeks prior to 
the election," is complied with where notice of election was 
published in a proper newspaper on four consecutive Thurs-
days next preceding a Tuesday election, although only 26 and 
not 28 days elapsed between publication of the first notice and 
the date of election, the words "at least," as used in the statute, 
having reference only to the number of publications in each 
of the four weeks and not setting a minimum period of at 
least four weeks between the first publication and the event 
·noticed. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Daniel N. Stevens, Judge. Affirmed. 
Proceeding in quo warranto to annul proceedings for an-
nexation of territory to city. Judgment for defendant affirmed. 
Edmund G. Bro-wn, Attorney General, Kenny & Morris, 
Edward J. Skelly in pro. per., and Robert W. Kenny for Ap-
pellant. 
Henry McClernan, City Attorney, John H. Lauten, As-
sistant City Attorney, O'Melveny & Myers, James L. Beebe, 
Sidney II. Wall and Bennett W. Priest for Respondent. 
SHENK, J.-'fhis is an appeal from a judgment for the 
defendant city of Glendale in a quo warranto proceeding 
which questions the validity of the annexation to the city o£ 
certain outlying districts under the Annexation Act of 1913. 
For the purpose of the appeal the parties have stipulated 
to the facts, from which it appears that on October 18, 1951, 
the council of the city adopted a resolution declaring its in-
tention to call special elections in each of three districts to 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Municipal Corporations, § 48; Am.Jur., Munic-
ipal Corporations, § 23 et seq. 
McK. Dig. Reference: [1] Municipal Corporations, § 40. 
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determine whether they should be incorporated within the 
boundaries of the city; that on November 10, 1951, the 
council duly adopted three resolutions ordering the special 
elections to be held within the districts on December 11, 1951; 
that notices of the three elections were published in a proper 
form and in a proper newspaper on the four Thursdays 
(November 15th, 22d, 29th, and December 6th, 1951) next 
preceding the elections held on Tuesday, December 11th, 1951; 
that the vote was in favor of annexation by a majority in each 
district; and that since January 28, 1952, the city has extended 
its government and control over each of the three districts as 
parts of the city of Glendale. 
[1] The plaintiff urges that the annexation proceedings 
are invalid because the provision of the Annexation Act of 
1913 which requires publication of notices of elections im-
poses a jurisdictional requirement which was not complied 
with. The pertinent language of this provision is set forth 
in section 35123 of the Government Code as follows : ''The 
city legislative body shall cause notice of the election to be 
published at least once a week for the four weeks prior to 
t11e eleetion, in a newspaper of general eirculation ... " The 
plaintiff contends that the quoted language requires that a 
full period of four weeks, totaling 28 days, must elapse be-
tween the first publication and the date of the election. In 
the present case there was a total of 26 days between the 
publication of the first notice and the date of the election. 
'l'he defendant contends. and the trial court held, that the 
statute requires that notice be published once in each of the 
four weeks prior to the election and that it is sufficient if 
the publicationf.l are made on any day of the respective week. 
The result reached by the trial court appears to be sup-
ported by the decisions of this court. F'ostler v. City of Los 
Angeles (1918), 179 Cal. 26R f176 P. 438], involved the fore-
l'llllner of tllis flame statnte. Notiee. of an annexation election 
at t}uJ.t time waR required to be pnblisbed "at least once a 
week for a period of four successive weeks next preceding" 
tlw election. 'l'he notice was published five times at weekly 
intervals and the election was held three days after the last 
publication. In holding the election valid the court stated at 
page 264: ''The notice was published once a week for five 
weeks and the last date of publication was within one week 
of the date of the election. This was sufficient . . . '' By 
a parity of reasoning a publication "within" a week of the 
date of the election would be a sufficient publication for the 
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week next preceding the election. Since the statute required 
publication ''for four successive weeks next preceding'' the 
election, the first publication which occurred more than four 
weeks in advance of the election would not appear to be a pub-
lication meeting statutory requirements. The remaining four 
publications took place within a period of 24 days prior to the 
election. rrhe publication requirement was held to be suffi-
cient. In the present case four publications took place within 
a period of 26 days prior to the election. 
The conclusion of the trial court is also supported by the 
<1ecision of this court in City of Lindsay v. Mack (1911), 160 
Cal. 647 [ 117 P. 9241, where the construction of language 
similar to that in Government Code, section 35123, was re-
quired. There the Municipal Bonding Act stated that an 
ordinance calling an election for the authorization of bonds 
should be published ''once a week for two weeks . . . and one 
insertion each week for two succeeding weeks shall be a 
sufficient publication . . . '' The court held that the statute 
did not require that 14 days elapse between the publication of 
the first notice and the date of the election and that an election 
held on the 26th of the month after publication of notices on 
the 14th and 21st of the month was valid. 
The plaintiff would distinguish the Lindsay case on the 
ground that the statute there under consideration was a 
"number of insertions" statute whereas the present case, it is 
claimed, is one concerned with the duration of the publication 
of the notice. If ''one insertion each week for two succeeding 
weeks'' refers only to a specific number of insertions, then a 
publication ''once a week for the four weeks'' must likewise 
have reference to a specific number of insertions. Both pro-
visions require that a specified number of notices be published 
dnring a designated period of time. 
The plaintiff attaehe>s considerable importance to the use 
of the word "for" and argues that the word "in" would 
have been used had the LegiRlature intended the construction 
given the> statute by the trial court. The statute in that event 
·would have read, "once a week in the four weeks prior to 
the election.'' In the city of Lindsay case the court construed 
the requirement of one insertion each week "for two succeed-
ing· week~'' to mean an insertion in or during each week. 
Moreover, speculation that the statute might have been framed 
more clearly to state the defendant's position is not significant 
in view of suppositions that the plaintiff's position could 
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have been more clearly stated as welL Por · example, section 
6064 of the Government Code, not applicable here, provide$ 
that "Publication of notice pursuant to this section shall be 
once a week for four successive weeks. . . . The period of 
notice commences upon the first day of publication and 
terminates at the end of the fourth week thereafter.'' 
The plaintiff· relies upon two cases which, it is asserted, 
construed language similar to that of Government Code,.secc 
tion 35123, contrary to the trial court's. decision herein. In 
County of Los Angeles v. Payne (1927), 82 Cal.App. 2],0 
[255 P. 281], the County Water Works District Act provided 
that notice for a hearing o:f. a petition for the formation of 
a district shall be "published at least once a week for two c()n-
secutive weeks . . . " The Dil'!triet Court of Appeal held 
that a publication on a particular day would constitute a pub-
lication for the following seven day period, and·. that it 
required an elapsed period of .14 days following the first 
publication to meet the. :requirements of the statute. In 
Becaombe v. Roe (1913), 22 Cal.App. 139 [133 P, 507], a 
provision in a deed of tmst stated that notice of a sale 
thereunder was to· be published '·'at least once a week for four 
consecutive weeks.'' The cou:rt held that a sale ·could not 
properly take place until 28 days had elapsed after the first 
publication 
Those cases are distinguishable, Neither contained language 
to indicate, with.· relation to. the event noticed, the parti~ular 
weeks in which the publication was to take place. The only 
requirement was that the weeks be ''consecutive" or "su(;~ 
cessive. '' Under these circu!llStances the court in each · cal'!e 
took the view that the day of publication· establh;hed the be-
gillning of the week. But in the present case section 85123 
establishes the particular weeks. It calls for publication "at 
least once a week for the four weeks prior to the election." 
(Emphasis added.) Itis clear that the weeks designated must 
be the four successive periods of seven days each next pre-
ceding the election. At least once in each of thesf! weeks the 
notice must be published. . In the Payne and the Seccombe 
cailes. the courts W(lre called upon to determine in which week 
the publication of a notice was effective.· In the present case 
that deternlination is precluded by the language of the statute. 
Neither {)f. those cases made reference to the similarity. of 
the language in t!te Lindsay case and in neither Wa$ a hearing 
sought in thJs court. 
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Both partiAs rely npon the decision in Early v. Doe (1853), 
16 How. (fl7 U.S.) fHO [14 J.J.Ed. 1079]. A statute in that 
t:ase r·e(]nirN1 the pnblieation of a noticA "once in each week, 
for- at least twelve successive weeks.'' The Supreme Court 
held that "when the legislator has used the words, for at least 
twelve successive weeks we cannot doubt that the words, at 
least as they would do in common parlance, mean a duration 
of the time that there is in twelve successive weeks, or eighty-
four days." However, the court made it clear that the signifi-
cant words were ''at least.'' In speculating on the omission 
of those words from the statute, the court stated: ''We do not 
doubt if the statute had been 'once in each week for twelve 
successive weeks' . . . that it might very well be concluded, 
that twelve notices in different successive weeks, though the 
last insertion of notice for sale was on the day of sale, was 
sufficient.'' In the present case the statute requires publica-
tion "at least once a week for the four weeks." The "at least" 
has reference only to the number of publications in each of 
the four weeks and does not set a minimum period of at least 
four weeks between the first publication and the event noticed. 
The statute is of the nature supposed by the Supreme Court 
in its hypothetical case. Furthermore, the language used in 
the Early case required publication for 12 "successive" weeks 
rather than for the 12 weeks prior to the event noticed, a 
distinction previously shown to be significant. 
No sufficient reason has been advanced why the decisions 
of this court in the Fostler and the City of Lindsay cases 
should be departed from. The language of the present statute 
furnishes at least as strong grounds for upholding the election 
thereunder as in those cases. We therefore conclude that the 
statute has been complied with. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, ,J., Traynor, J., and Spence, J., 
concurred. 
SCHAUER, J., Dissenting.-! would reverse the judgment. 
'l'he elections here questioned were special elections. It is 
fundamental that in special election proceedings the giving 
of the notice prescribed by statute is jurisdictional. (See 
Stumpf v. Board of Supervisors (1901), 131 Cal. 364, 368 
[63 P. 663, 82 Am.St.Rep. 350] ; People ex rel. McKune v. 
John B. WeUer· (1858), 11 Cal. 49, 62 [70 Am.Dec. 754].) 
The notices which were given did not meet the statutory re-
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qnirements. This conrt has 110 power to lessen the period of 
notic·.e fixed by the r~F:gislai.ure.. 'rhe anm~xation F:]cedions were 
therefore void and of no effeet. 
Insofar aR it is urged that this court has already adopted 
a policy of tolerating departures from the legislative mini-
mums I think examination of the eases eited in the majority 
opinion discloses that they are not authority for the holding 
reached. ln the :first place, from a reading of the controlling 
statute (Gov. Code, § 35123) it is at once apparent that the 
Jtotiee required is of the duration type, rather than the "num-
ber of insertions" type which the court was considering in 
City of Lindsay v. Mack (1911), 160 Cal. 647 [117 P. 924]. 
The statute here relevant specifies that '' 'l'he city legislative 
body shall cause notice of the election to be published at [east 
once a week for the four weeks prior to the election, in a 
newspaper ... , or if there is none, by posting it at least four 
weeks next preceding the election in three public places within 
the territory." (Italics added.) 
vVe are dealing here with a newspaper publication but the 
equally carefully worded alternative requirement (in the 
sentence above quoted) that if there is no newspaper in which 
publication can be made the notice must be posted for a 
period four weeks in duration next preceding the election 
seems to me to leave no doubt of the legislative intent that a 
full four-week period of time must elapse between the first 
giving of the notice (whether it be by publication or by post-
ing) and the date of the election. The notice in each case is 
a duration notice; in each case the period is four weeks; and 
in each case the four weeks is to run "prior to" or "next 
preceding'' the election. Since the elapsed period here was 
only 26 days, it follows that the statute was not complied with, 
and I think this court should unhesitatingly so hold. I do 
not believe that it is a proper function of courts to whittle 
down a jurisdictional requirement. If by judicial construc-
tion two days can be eliminated from the statutory period, 
then why not four or six or perhaps eight, when occasion 
arises? But that is beside the point. The controlling con-
sideration to me is that it is the function of the Legislature 
to :fix the duration and character of notice and that it is the 
function of this court to uphold the law as enacted. The law 
as enacted requires 28 days. 
Fostler v. City of Los Angeles ( 1918), 179 Cal. 263 [176 
P. 438], is cited as support for the view that the 26-day notice 
40 C.2d-{14 
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ln~re given was sufficient. In that case the applicable statute 
required notice to be published ''at least once a week for a 
period of four successive weeks next preceding'' the election. 
'l'he notiee was published five times at weekly intervals and 
the election was held three days after the fifth publication. 
Obviously the publication at weekly intervals for each of five 
successive publications provided not less than the four weeks' 
notice required by the statute, and consequently that case fur-
nishes no justification for a holding that publication covering 
a period less than four weeks in duration is adequate. 
As early as Early v. Doe ( 1853), 16 How. (57 U.S.) 610 
[14 L.Ed 1079], we find the United States Supreme Court 
dealing with a statute using language so similar to that with 
which we are concerned that its decision cannot by the facts 
and on principle be distinguished. It cogently supports the 
view that the requirement that publication be ''at least once 
a week for the four weeks prior to the election'' contemplates 
an elapsed time of 28 days. In the Early case the language 
of the statute was that publication must be made ''once in 
each week, for at least twelve successive weeks.'' The holding 
of the court was clear and specific ; it said the words ''mean 
a duration of the time that there is in twelve successive weeks, 
or eighty-four days." 
Until the holding of the instant case I thought it could be 
accepted as settled as to both law and fact that a week is 
made up of seven days and that ''at least once a week for 
the four weeks prior to the election'' or ''at least four weeks 
next preceding the election'' must encompass at least 28 days. 
Admittedly the electors received notices of only 26 days. I 
would therefore hold the elections void and reverse the judg-
ment. 
CARTER, ,J., Dissenting.-I agree with the views expressed 
by Mr. ,Justice Schauer, but I wish to call attention to one 
salient point overlooked by the majority, and that is that 
notice of the holding of an election is only one element to be 
considered. There is a time element which is of equal, if not 
greater, importance than the element of notice. It may be 
conceded that a substantial and not a strict compliance with 
the statute provides adequate nohce of the election. 
But notice merely informs the electorate when and where 
an election is going to be held. The duration of the period of 
tirne between the giving of notice and the date of the elec-
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tion is the important element which permits the full func-
tioning of the democratic process. 
There can be no such thing as substantial compliance with 
the element of duration. The statute required a minimum 
of 28 days te elapse before the election was held. Only 26 
days were permitted to elapse and at oral.arg:ument .. counsel 
for . defendant admitted that under his view of . the statute 
this time could even have been further shortened to 22 days. 
'l'his must be. conceded. 
The full duration of the prescribed time represents the 
I.>egislature 's decision as to the minimum period req:uired 
for the completion· of the opinion-forming ·process. It must 
be conceded that this was a ''close" election~* Who can say 
what number of minds might have been changed one way or 
the other during the two days which defendant cut off . the 
statutory period by allowing only 26 days after the first 
publication of .the Mtice, 
. T}le voters may have been given notice of the election even 
though the time had been shortened but they should not be 
legally deprived of their right to the full statutory period in 
which to persuade others. to their point of view. When the 
statute prescribed four weeks, it must have. been the intention 
of t.he framers that those interested in the outcome. of the 
election would have at least 28 days within which to present 
the pros and cons of the propositions to the voters. 'fhe fixing 
of a shorter period is a violation of both the spirit and letter 
of the statute. 
I would reverse the judgment. 
*''The vote in the New York Avenue annexation district was. 1641 
for annexation and 1525 against aljne:x:a,tion. The total number of 
qualfiied electors of the New York Avenue annexation district was 4430 
rurd the. number of eleetors who vote<Lat said election was 3166, or 
71.4% of the total qualified electors. 
''The vote in. the Honolulu District annexation district was 2.05 for 
annexation and 141 against annexation. 'the total number of qualified 
electors of the Honolulu Avenue annexation district was 433 and the 
numbe!' of electors who· voted at said election was 846, or a:Ppro:ximately 
80% of the totll;l qqali:fied electors. 
''The vote in the Chevy Chase Drive annexation district was. 15 for 
annexation ::tnd 11 against• anne:xation. The total number of qualified 
elli!etors of the· Chevy Chase Drive :;~Une:xation d:ist:riet. was 25 and the 
11umber of electors .who voted at .. said election was 26, :r~p:rese1lting 
104% of the total qualified eleetors .. (One elector, residi11g ~lose to .but 
outside the boundaries of said district was erroneously pennitted to 
vote.)" (Agreed Statement on Appeal.) 
